Report

Race in Britain: Inequality, Identity & Belonging

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Race in Britain: Inequality, Identity & Belonging

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Foreword

This Cumberland Lodge Report marks the culmination of a 12-month project to explore how inequality, identity and belonging intersect with race in Britain today.

Race in Britain: Inequality, Identity & Belonging draws on the wisdom and experience of an interdisciplinary representation of academics, policymakers, business leaders, NGOs, community practitioners and activists, and young people, from across the UK. It offers a unique insight into current thinking and best practice, and a series of practical, policy-focused recommendations for promoting progress towards more peaceful, open and inclusive societies.

Part I of this report provides an independent, interdisciplinary briefing on race in Britain today, in relation to inequality, identity and belonging. Part II summarises the key themes and best-practice recommendations that emerged from our Cumberland Lodge conference held in November 2018, in partnership with independent race equality think tank The Runnymede Trust. These ideas were reviewed and refined at an expert consultation we convened with a broad spectrum of conference representatives and further specialists in May 2019.

Race in Britain is one of four key issues that Cumberland Lodge addressed in its 2018-19 series on Identities & Belonging. We look forward to seeing how it inspires positive action to tackle the causes and effects of social division across society, at a local and national level.

Canon Dr Edmund Newell
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About the author

This report is written by Dr Farhan Samanani, who was commissioned by Cumberland Lodge as a freelancer Research Associate, to support its 2018-19 Race in Britain: Inequality, Identity & Belonging project.

Farhan is an early-career postdoctoral researcher who specialises in the study of grassroots community building and everyday co-operation, and the shaping of political consensus in diverse areas. He completed his PhD at the University of Cambridge in 2017, with a thesis on local understandings of community and diversity in the London neighbourhood of Kilburn.

Since October 2018, he has been a social anthropology researcher in the Department for Socio-Cultural Diversity at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity in Göttingen, Germany. He is currently working on a project that explores links between grassroots political movements and larger-scale policy change.

Prior to taking up his current role, Farhan was based at the University of Oxford, where he researched the everyday experiences of new parents and the communities around them, in the wake of austerity.

Drawing on this background, Farhan has worked with a variety of community, national and international organisations, ranging from local community groups to the World Bank and Oxfam. He has advised on a range of issues around migration, diversity, policy and inclusivity. Farhan has also written about his research in the popular press, including articles in Aeon magazine and the Huffington Post.
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Executive summary

Popular understandings of the nature and significance of ‘race’, and patterns of inequality and exclusion affecting minority groups, have transformed over the years. Whilst overtly racist attitudes have become unacceptable for the majority of Britons, people in minority groups still report experiences of discrimination. This is coupled with less overt forms of prejudice, which often take structural, unconscious or institutional forms, and sustain unequal outcomes. Enduring inequality is challenged locally – where new forms of identity and belonging take shape, cutting across barriers – as well as nationally, through initiatives such as the Government’s Race Disparity Audit, and through challenging conversations on the nature of ‘Britishness’.

Changing histories of race, inequality and belonging

• Migration to the UK has a long history, and many minority communities were settled in the UK long before the Windrush generation.

• Colonial connections, policies and legacies continue to play a significant role in UK immigration patterns.

• From the 1960s to the 1980s, a shared identity of ‘political blackness’ helped activists and scholars to identify prejudice and exclusion experienced by minority communities.

• In the 1980s, there was a shift to understanding diversity in terms of ‘culture’ rather than ‘race’. However, popular ideas of minority cultures continued to present certain characteristics as innate, sustaining forms of discrimination that had been previously expressed in the language of race.

• This shift highlighted supposed cultural differences that distinguished minority communities, and thus challenged the idea of an encompassing political blackness.
• Other groups have related to this history in different ways: Roma and Travellers have often been excluded from official celebrations of multiculturalism, whilst white-British working-class people may resent multiculturalism as a form of recognition they cannot access.

**Attitudes to race and belonging today**

• British attitudes to race and belonging vary across time, and views depend on how questions are framed. For example, more people will express support for multiculturalism in the abstract, but fewer will agree that diversity has strengthened British culture.

• Whilst a majority of people reject overt racism, many still identify a tension between diversity and a supposed British identity. Explicit forms of racism have declined, but significant challenges remain around forms of structural and institutional racism and unconscious bias.

• Public opinion is shaped by competing discourses on, and visions of, the concept of race. These include: racism, cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, hybridity, conviviality, tolerance, utilitarianism, communitarianism, colour-blindness, nativism, localism, and post-imperial nostalgia.

**Structuring belonging**

• The practices of key institutions, such as the police, hospitals, schools, local government and community organisations, play a critical role in issues of inequality and feelings of belonging.

• There are major disparities amongst ethnic groups in terms of key social outcomes, including housing, health, education and access to justice. These disparities exist on a national level, and point to systematic challenges.
• Local neighbourhoods can play an important role in challenging exclusion, but robust institutional support at the local level is also necessary.

• People within minority groups often have high levels of belief in the capacity of people from different backgrounds to get along, and express a strong sense of belonging both to local areas and to the UK. Whilst this reveals significant potential for engagement, minorities often also feel that the UK does not present them with fair opportunities.

• Residential and educational segregation has generally been on the decline, but persists in certain areas. Residential patterns are influenced by networks of support and the distribution of resources, and factors of segregation are often intertwined with those of inequality.

**Contemporary identities**

• Living in the UK transforms identities for all, but the patterns and directions of such change can vary amongst minority groups. Identity formation is influenced by multiple factors, including local neighbourhoods, national discourses around race and British identity, government policy, and transnational connections and ethnic histories.

• In broad terms, there are important patterns of generational shift: first-generation immigrants retain the strongest ties to places of origin, whilst later generations take more creative approaches to reimagining their identity. Such creativity can generate new forms of openness and inclusion, as well as modes of closure, or even fundamentalism.

• Identities respond to policy incentives – in certain cases, the allocation of community funding or the dynamics of electoral politics can work to frame identities in fixed and competitive terms.

• In many cases, minority-group identities do not fit neatly within a pre-given set of cultural boundaries. Instead, they are fluid
and dynamic, combining elements from different dimensions of experience – such as schools, homes, pop culture and traditions – and taking different forms in different contexts.

- Diverse minority communities are often united by shared experiences, such as those relating to policing or income inequality. However, no encompassing political framework, equivalent to political blackness, currently exists. The efforts and concerns of different minority communities can be prone to divergence.

- At a national level, education and the telling of national history remain two key areas in which inclusion remains uncertain and contested.

Policy recommendations

- Policymakers and other leaders should be pragmatic in identifying persistent inequality and determine, with a view to their audience, whether the language of race and/or racism is productive.

- Efforts to improve race disparities need to start from a systematic perspective, highlighting long-term and large-scale patterns. Responses to such disparities need to take place on a similar level.

- Prejudicial beliefs may often intertwine with legitimate hardships. Effective mediation and multi-dimensional approaches to problem-solving are required to address this. Inequality and discrimination, in particular, are often interconnected, but nonetheless distinct, challenges.

- When working with minority communities, a pluralist approach is needed: no single voice or organisation should be taken uncritically to ‘represent’ a community.

- Patterns of inequality and discrimination are often embedded in majority cultures, institutions and structures, and should not just be left to minority groups to resolve.
• Effective change can result from a focus on existing common values and a shared sense of belonging, rather than from narratives of division or conflict.

• Community-based approaches require robust support and mediation/facilitation, as well as sufficient time to develop meaningful relationships.

• Representation at a national level, and in foundational stories of British identity, plays a crucial role in shaping perceptions of who can claim to belong in the UK, and thus ought to be taken seriously in policy, education and other interventions.
I.

Old questions in new times
Introduction

Out of the terms we use to talk about identity – including 'race', 'ethnicity', 'gender' and 'identity' itself – 'race' conjures a vision of a particularity fixed and innate sort of difference. However, race is very much a socially constructed and contested identity, given different meanings at different times. Part I of this report traces the ways in which changing ideas of race have set the terms of belonging for minority groups in the UK throughout history. It examines how such ideas of race have been challenged in the hopes of making society more equal, and how race is reimagined today in ways that continue to pose ongoing challenges. These challenges are explored with particular reference to ideas of inequality and belonging, which highlight unequal outcomes and life chances, and variations in the extent to which people feel 'at home' and included within their communities, cities and the wider nation.

Although much progress has been made, we have also come to inherit a set of ideas about race, identity and the collective good that are showing themselves to be increasingly ill-suited to the 21st-century context. The fragmentation of older political coalitions, the decline of community spaces and programmes, and shifts in the labour market that have created new forms of exclusion, all demand a new politics of race that can cut across group divisions and speak to contemporary concerns.

Questions about the place of diversity in British society have acquired a new urgency, not least in light of the vote to leave the European Union. In the year that followed the Brexit referendum, reported hate crimes rose by 29%, prompting fears that the vote had given new license to simmering feelings of racial resentment (Achiume 2018). There are numerous examples of recent cases in which victims were abused for being ‘illegal’ or told to ‘go home’, regardless of their citizenship status (Jones et al 2017). The beliefs that underlie these incidents of hate crime – that it is possible to tell whether someone is ‘truly’ British on the basis of superficial
markers such as skin-colour, ethnic dress or accent alone – reveal the enduring power of racial thinking in society today. In 2019, hate crimes in the UK rose to record levels, with the largest proportion of these being motivated by race (BBC 2019).

'Questions about the place of diversity in British society have acquired a new urgency, not least in light of the vote to leave the European Union.'

Yet race is not the only lens through which minorities in Britain have been understood. As migrants from across the world have come to settle in Britain, and as communities, policymakers and popular sentiment have adapted to their presence, a range of competing discourses have emerged to characterise diversity in different ways. Cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, tolerance and nativism are just a few of the prevalent discourses for understanding and discussing diversity in Britain.

These discourses exist alongside one another and grapple for public prominence, in part because they speak to different experiences and address different issues around diversity. Alongside the challenges already faced by minorities in cultivating a sense of belonging in Britain, the white-British majority has had to rethink its identity and institutions in relation to diversity. Different discourses offer majorities and minorities, alike, a range of resources which can be used to grapple with these challenges. In turn, as particular discourses gain prominence, they help to shape broader social outcomes, such as inequalities in sentencing within the justice system, or enduring pay gaps between majority and minority communities.

'Diversity has also generated significant creativity: new identities and modes of belonging have taken shape in response to the challenges faced by both minorities and majorities.'
Diversity has also generated significant creativity: new identities and modes of belonging have taken shape in response to the challenges faced by both minorities and majorities. For example, certain neighbourhoods have come to be marked by rich local traditions of co-operation or openness, which transcend the confines of popular discourses around racial or cultural boundaries. Elsewhere, segregation has deepened, as minorities have shunned difficult encounters with the majority, or as white-British citizens have fled diversifying neighbourhoods. In both cases, new identities have been shaped as life in Britain has transformed and been transformed by various minority groups. All the while, on the national stage, new conversations have opened up around what it means to be British in relation to enduring questions of race, ethnicity and diversity.

The arrival of the Empire Windrush from the Caribbean heralded the start of modern migration to Britain, and ever since, there has been a persistent debate about the place of ‘otherness’ within British society (Lunn 1989; Naidoo 1998). This debate is ongoing and becoming increasingly complex, as it reflects a growing range of experiences, issues and perspectives. ‘Diversity’ no longer holds a single or unambiguous meaning for the British public. Today, many British citizens consider it to be both a source of national strength and pride, as well as a persistent challenge.

‘Diversity’ no longer holds a single or unambiguous meaning for the British public.'
2. In this report, ‘migrants’ refers to all those who move to a particular place, such as the UK, while ‘immigrants’ refers specifically to those migrants who settle. The line between the two is not always clear (for instance, in the case of long-term sojourners) and, as such, the more encompassing term migrants is used in most instances.

Contested histories

Migration in Britain is closely entangled with Britain’s imperial and political history, with the roots of contemporary migration dynamics often reaching back hundreds of years. Migrants have always faced discrimination and prejudice, although the extent of these attitudes, and the ways in which they are expressed and justified, have changed throughout the years. In the decades following World War II, beliefs in the innate racial or spiritual inferiority of migrants gave way to attitudes that targeted the cultures and beliefs of migrants instead, often treating these as fixed characteristics (Barker 1982; Barkan 1992; Gilroy 2013). In response to these discriminatory experiences, migrants have adopted a range of strategies that have likewise transformed over time. These range from a close reliance on existing networks of family and friends, to the cultivation of common ‘non-white’ political identities, to the active embracing of diverse cultural identities as part of a multicultural nation.

From early migration to Windrush

Migration in Britain is often discussed and presented as a post-war phenomenon, sparked by the arrival of Commonwealth migrants (Naidoo 1998). This contributes to the enduring perception that Britain is not traditionally a nation of immigrants (Baucom 1999; Cesarani 1992; Jones et al. 2017). It is true that, following World War II, migration to Britain not only increased significantly but also became more diverse, in terms of where migrants originated from. However, migration has always been a significant feature of British history, from the early arrival of the Celts, to that of the Romans, Anglo-Saxons and Normans in subsequent eras.

‘...migration has always been a significant feature of British history, from the early arrival of the Celts, to that of the Romans, Anglo-Saxons and Normans in subsequent eras.’
Although there is evidence that African soldiers were present as part of Roman rule in Britain, the earliest substantial records of non-white migrants emerge in the 16th Century. These people were often former slaves of other nations or – from the start of the British slave trade in 1562 – of Britain itself. Other early migrants were brought to Britain as interpreters, domestic servants or prostitutes. Their presence was often seen as a threat to British public order, as evidenced by two campaigns led by Queen Elizabeth I to round up and deport ‘divers blackmoors brought into this realme’ at the end of the 1500s (Innes 2000: 8).

Other early immigrant groups met with different reactions. For example, Protestant Huguenots fleeing persecution in France in the mid-1600s were widely welcomed, in particular for the wealth and valuable artisanal skills that many of them possessed (Gwynn 2001). Whilst 16th-century, working-class arrivals from Ireland were often stereotyped as ‘criminals’, their wealthier or aristocratic compatriots were often incorporated into the upper echelons of British society (Crymble 2018; Ohlmeyer 2012). There is also evidence of Gypsies living in Britain from as early as 1567. For centuries, Romani migrants worked as travelling farm labourers and traders, and were often treated as indispensable, even though they were met with mistrust and hostility for their itinerant way of life (Cressy 2018).

As British global influence grew in subsequent centuries, and the British Empire expanded, patterns of immigration to Britain increasingly came to be shaped by relations of trade, politics and empire. In turn, these patterns helped to shape migration into the 20th Century. Following a series of pogroms in Russia between 1880 and 1920, around 140,000 Jews fled to Britain. Most of these people had existing links to the 46,000 Jews already living here. These earlier Jewish settlers had largely arrived as part of particular trade initiatives, or on the basis of longstanding commercial relationships that helped to sustain Britain’s domestic and overseas enterprises (Godley 2001).

Other groups followed similar patterns. Irish migrants fleeing economic hardship often followed the trajectories of earlier
Irish arrivals, and, collectively, the Irish were positioned as an ‘army’ of cheap labour for Britain and its colonies (Ghaill 2000; Howe 2002). Similarly, during the 1800s, British merchant and military ships came to recruit increasing numbers of skilled Somali and Yemeni seamen, many of Muslim faith, who generally settled around British ports, taking up employment as industrial labourers (Harris 2004; MacLean 2010). Britain’s port cities were also home to other groups, such as Indian sailors who were initially employed on British ships but were refused passage back home, or West African migrants, ranging from former slaves to the children of colonial elites (Adi 1998; Fisher 2006). This in turn helped to shape these cities, and nearby industrial areas, into popular sites of settlement for 20th-century migrants. These early migrant groups faced shifting forms of discrimination – within the communities in which they lived and worked, and within the national press and in policy more broadly – often based around race and religion.

For these and other early groups of migrants, Britain’s imperial ambitions and political entanglements played a powerful role in motivating, and sometimes even forcing, their move to Britain (Winder 2010). The British imperial presence established its power and carried out its rule in highly varied ways – from the settler-colonies of Canada and Australia, to forms of commerce-led colonialism in India or South Africa. Nonetheless, in broad terms, colonialism was motivated by a desire to expand British wealth and power, through the control of territory and by taking advantage of local resources and labour. These attempts to enrich and empower ranged from outright slavery and military violence to forms of trade or contracted labour, with profits typically skewed in favour of the British. As villages
were destroyed, populations uprooted, cities and roads built, farmland or mines brought under consolidated authority, new trades and industries developed, and new networks of global communication and trade built, a massive shift occurred in populations, cultures and opportunities for livelihood, the effects of which are felt to this day (see: Darwin 2009; Gott 2011; Hyam 2010; McClintock 2013; Stoler 2013; 2016).

'The arrival of around 800 Caribbean migrants on the ship Empire Windrush in June 1948 has been seen as the symbolic start of an influx of arrivals from the Empire and Commonwealth in the post-war period.'

In the aftermath of World War II, Britain was faced with a struggling economy, significant labour shortages – estimated at over one million workers (Kay and Miles 1988: 215) – and an urgent need to rebuild. To support this post-war effort, migration from countries within the Empire, and later from across the Commonwealth, was actively encouraged. Britain advertised heavily for positions in the NHS and across the public sector. The arrival of around 800 Caribbean migrants on the ship Empire Windrush in June 1948 has been seen as the symbolic start of an influx of arrivals from the Empire and Commonwealth in the post-war period (Lunn 1989; Naidoo 1998).

Meanwhile, shortly after Indian Independence in 1947, significant numbers of migrants started to arrive from South Asia. Between 1946 and 1951, a substantial population of displaced citizens from the Soviet Union were also recruited as ‘European Volunteer Workers’. The latter were seen by policymakers, and by certain sections of the press, to be more capable of assimilating and contributing to British ‘stock’ than those coming to Britain from the Empire and Commonwealth (Kay and Miles 1989). These post-war migrants joined a population of thousands of others from the Empire and the Commonwealth who had arrived during World War II itself, to help the war effort (Fryer 1984).
Migration in the postcolonial moment

Prior to 1948, people living in Britain’s overseas territories and in Britain itself shared the common legal status of ‘British subject’ – effectively a common citizenship. Many of those who had grown up under British rule overseas understood themselves to be fundamentally British – a message repeated by British-run schools and by other colonial institutions. For new arrivals, Britain was often thought of as ‘the mother country’ (Webster 1998). To some scholars, policymakers and voices in the media at the time, these new arrivals in Britain were ‘dark strangers’, whose presence was seen as being fundamentally incompatible with British identity, norms and values (Waters 1997). Others welcomed them as fellow citizens. For instance, in reporting the arrival of the Empire Windrush in June 1948, the London Evening Standard used the headline, ‘WELCOME HOME’ (Fryer 1984: 372).

In 1948, the British Nationality Act differentiated British citizenship from that of the Commonwealth for the first time. Those born in Britain itself, or in British colonies that had not yet gained independence, were granted the common citizenship status of ‘Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies’. This meant that, throughout the 1940s and 50s, migrants from countries such as Jamaica or Kenya arrived in Britain as full British citizens. Meanwhile, the 1948 Act also allowed citizens of the newly-independent Commonwealth countries, such as Canada and India, to freely migrate to Britain and to acquire Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies after one year of residence. Despite their equal, or nearly equal status as citizens, both groups often faced intense hostility upon arrival; in practice, their status as British citizens or Commonwealth subjects did little to counter the widespread belief that people with black or brown skin could never be ‘truly British’.

These new arrivals in the 1940s and 50s often struggled to find housing or private sector employment because of racial prejudice, and many faced everyday harassment, belittling and even violence (Fryer 1984). At the same time, certain industries
were actively recruiting overseas workers as a means of driving down wages in response to dwindling profits, which in turn positioned these new arrivals in perceived opposition to the existing labour force (Amin 2003; Hall et al 1978). Throughout the 1950s, race riots frequently broke out in cities such as Nottingham, Birmingham and London, including the 1958 Notting Hill riots in London, where, for over a week, a mob of hundreds of white-British residents ransacked the homes of Caribbean citizens and assaulted passers-by in racially-motivated attacks. These riots were driven by complex forces, including the resentment of certain segments of the white-British population to the presence of migrants, and the anger of some migrants over feelings of exclusion (Bagguley and Hussain 2012).

During this period, crime statistics revealed similarly complex patterns. For example, according to records, Irish, Commonwealth and colonial 3 migrants were, on average, between 1.5 to 3.5 times more likely to commit violent crimes than the non-migrant population, with Irish migrants having the highest rates of offence. Reported incidents tended to be concentrated in certain domains, with Commonwealth and colonial migrants over-represented in domestic disputes and frequently under-represented in other areas. Likewise, offenders tended to be concentrated in certain geographic areas, often those marked by higher levels of poverty (Bottoms 1967). However, national media and policy narratives largely focused on migrant crime as if it were a uniform phenomenon, particularly perpetrated by non-white migrants, and offending rates were often exaggerated as being several times higher than they actually were – often by using manipulated statistics or by singling out the most shocking examples of crime (ibid; Gutzmore 1983).

From the late 1940s onwards, there were growing calls for the Government to exercise greater control over ‘coloured immigration’, which were initially resisted but ultimately led to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act (Solomos 1993). The Act restricted immigration from the Commonwealth and remaining colonies to people who already had existing connections to the UK, who would be granted work permits.
to enable them to migrate and settle. The required nature of ‘connection’ to the UK was left intentionally vague, leading to an unequal system whereby migrants from different countries or backgrounds effectively faced different entry requirements and prospects (Hansen 2002; Karatani 2004). Migrants selected on the basis of their professional skills, during this period, often found that they were unable to obtain professional employment upon arrival in the UK, and instead moved into lower-skilled industries (BBC 2014).

Meanwhile, the early 1960s also saw several former colonies in the Caribbean and East Africa gain independence. Many of the people who had migrated to Britain as full citizens while their birth countries were still colonies suddenly had their British Citizenship rescinded, with their citizenships defaulting to their countries of birth. They were required to apply for ‘naturalisation’, but since a large number had lived in Britain for as long as two decades, many were unaware of this change in their citizenship status and hence did not apply (Couper and Santamaria 1984; Cesarani 2002) – all of which partly sowed the seeds for the 2018 ‘Windrush Scandal’.

Against the backdrop of these new restrictions, migration patterns shifted towards a greater emphasis on family reunification and ‘chain migration’ in the 1960s, where settled migrants would either directly sponsor dependents abroad, or else help them to secure employment that would support a work permit application.

...an unequal system whereby migrants from different countries or backgrounds effectively faced different entry requirements and prospects.'

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East African Asians also came to make up a larger share of immigration to the UK, as several hundreds of thousands continued to retain London-issued British passports that exempted them from the restrictions of the 1962 Act (Hansen 2002). Increasingly forceful ‘Africanisation’ policies in the recently independent countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were a motivator for migration until, in 1968, the UK Government passed the second Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which further restricted entry from Commonwealth countries to those who were either born in the UK or had at least one parent or grandparent who had been born in the UK.

The Commonwealth Immigrants Acts of the 1960s sparked a substantial outcry from opposing politicians, minorities, activists, and British subjects abroad. The Acts had collectively reversed the status of Commonwealth and colonial subjects as citizens of the UK, in response to a popular sentiment that these people did not truly belong to Britain. Those who opposed this legislation at the time felt that it undermined the very institution of citizenship, in favour of a racialised, ‘whites-only’ ideal of British belonging (Hansen 2002).

In the following decade, these developments were consolidated by the 1971 Immigration Act. In an attempt to resolve some of the ambiguities remaining around legal status, the new Act offered ‘indefinite leave to remain’ – but not citizenship – to all Commonwealth migrants residing in the UK. However, the Home Office did not keep records of who had been granted leave to remain; neither did it issue migrants with any paperwork to confirm their new status (BBC 2018). This was a further contributing factor to the recent Windrush Scandal.
These legal shifts not only eroded prospects of citizenship for new (and even settled) migrants, but also, in so doing, helped to rewrite the history of the British Empire in the popular imagination. Migrants were reimagined as 'outsiders' arriving from foreign nations, rather than (initially) as fellow citizens moving within a single global empire, or (more recently) as people linked by shared histories, identities and global networks of trade and travel, and by the moral and political legacies of empire (Karatani 2004; Tyler 2012; Webster 1998).

These legal shifts... helped to rewrite the history of the British Empire in the popular imagination. Migrants were reimagined as 'outsiders' arriving from foreign nations...' 

‘Rivers of Blood’

As Britain’s migrant population grew, so too did anxieties around racial tensions. At times these concerns were framed in terms of competition over scarce opportunities (including housing and jobs), but they were also often voiced in the vague language of maintaining ‘racial harmony’ or ‘positive race relations’. Precisely because the idea of racial harmony could mean everything and nothing, it was often used to encompass anxieties about issues as varied as: changing economic prospects; Britain’s declining global position; the loss of Empire; and broader questions of social welfare and happiness (Miles 1984; Waters 1997).

In 1968, the Conservative MP, Enoch Powell, made his now (in)famous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, in which he predicted that 'white' Britons would soon become ‘strangers in their own country’. Powell painted a picture of white Britons who were unable to access education or healthcare, or to live freely, constrained by the wilful ‘domination’ of migrant cultures and by race relations legislation that prevented any ‘push back’ (Powell 2007).

Powell’s speech marked a turning point in popular discourse, when members of the public and politicians found it increasingly
acceptable to use anti-migrant rhetoric (Gilroy 2013). In 1969, a Gallup poll found Powell to be ‘the most admired person’ in Britain (Dumbrell 2006: 43). In 1970, the Conservatives won a surprise electoral victory, and subsequent analysis has credited this victory to Powell’s impact on positioning his party as the one most likely to restrict migration (Studlar 1978).

Around the same time, popular discourse around crimes committed by members of minority groups reached a new intensity. There was a general sense that Britain was in ‘crisis’. In their study of the 1972-73 ‘Mugging Crisis’, Hall et al. (1978) revealed that, despite these fears, there had not in fact been any rapid rise in cases of violent robbery. They argued that the adoption of the US-American term ‘mugging’ into popular discourse had led to fears about a supposedly organised and culturally-ingrained phenomenon of crime that was perpetrated by minorities. This perception, in turn, served to justify exclusion and heavy-handed policing against minority racial groups. Public fears were focused, in particular, on dense urban communities with large minority populations.

'Family and chain migration often involve patterns of spatial clustering, whereby new migrants choose to settle close to existing connections or migrant communities...'

Family and chain migration often involve patterns of spatial clustering, whereby new migrants choose to settle close to existing connections or migrant communities, and particularly to people or communities who share their own religions or places of origin (see pages 40-43 below). For instance, London’s East End came to be known as a hub for the Bangladeshi community – and especially for those from the Sylhet region – whilst Pakistanis from Mirapur frequently took up industrial employment in the Midlands, Yorkshire, or in the developing industrial towns of southern England (Anitha and Pearson 2013). These geographical patterns have served to create areas in which minority groups are disproportionately concentrated.
Over time, images and stories from these immigration hubs helped to fuel popular anxieties that Britain as a whole was being ‘overrun’ by migrants. These areas also became popular targets for racist agitators. Meanwhile, they faced their own challenges (such as concentrated unemployment), as industries that had once employed migrant workers in large numbers began to decline (Phillips 1998).

At the same time, many of these areas became particular centres of creativity, solidarity and resistance, both within and beyond minority communities (Gilroy 2013). Many developed unique local cultures of co-operation, belonging or conviviality (Back 1996; Baumann 1996; Hickman et al 2012; Watson 2006; Wessendorf 2014).

From 'political blackness' to distinct cultures

From the 1960s through to the 1980s, scholars and activists within Britain’s minority communities cultivated a growing awareness of the shared struggles they faced, and this gave rise to the concept of ‘political blackness’, which provided a new way of understanding and organising around the notion of a ‘non-white’ experience, identity and politics. This concept was expressed in different ways by figures such as the novelist Salman Rushdie, the scholar Stuart Hall, the novelist, public intellectual and activist Ambalavaner Sivanandan, and the prominent activist group ‘Southall Black Sisters’ (see Alexander 2018; and Modood 1999 for overviews of the concept’s history).

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At the same time, public attitudes towards race and difference were gradually changing. In the 1960s, fears about new arrivals
had often been expressed in racial terms ⁴, but as claims of innate racial differences came under greater scrutiny and as equality legislation began to target discrimination on the basis of race, these same concerns began to be re-cast in a language of ‘incompatible culture’.

By the 1980s, the governing Conservative party had decisively targeted cultural differences as the source of friction around migration. From this perspective, migrants were welcome, so long as they committed to adopting existing 'British' values and cultural markers. Those who failed to do so were seen as threats. However, scholars have since argued that this shift was less of a rejection of racism and its associated prejudices, and more of a reframing, which re-cast pre-existing prejudices in the more acceptable language of cultural difference. This language partly recycled the old logic of race, by presenting culture as something that was largely innate and inescapable. However, it mixed this with a choice-based notion of culture, where minorities were exhorted to ultimately become more ‘British’. Issues of persistent racial discrimination and economic disadvantage, which so often kept minorities from enjoying an equal space in public life, were often overlooked (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Barker 1982; Barkan 1992; Gilroy 2013; Hill 2009).

'This culture-based perspective was no longer based on a perceived racial hierarchy from black to white but, instead, suggested that groups were characterised by a collection of differently-valued traits.'

This culture-based perspective was no longer based on a perceived racial hierarchy from black to white but, instead, suggested that groups were characterised by a collection of differently-valued traits. For instance, Asians and East-African Asians were framed, on the one hand, as earnest and hardworking, but also as being somewhat ‘closed off’, excessively religious, effeminate or weak, on the other. Meanwhile, people of Afro-Caribbean backgrounds were frequently stereotyped...
as being tough and cool, but prone to delinquency (Alexander 2000; Modood 1999; Webster 2016). In many cases, an imaginary and ill-defined ideal of ‘Britishness’ served as the implicit reference point for these prejudices, against which the traits of migrant groups were judged. For example, East African Asians disproportionately came from middle-class backgrounds – largely a consequence of their position within British colonial hierarchies in East Africa. In the UK, they were often better placed to present themselves as middle class and to embrace typically middle-class aspirations, which helped them to be seen as a ‘model minority’ (Modood 1999). Amongst the differently-valued traits that the new discourse of cultural difference highlighted, religiosity (particularly in relation to Islam) and criminality emerged in the press and in policy circles as particular areas of public concern.

The emergence of cultural racism, along with frustrations about inhabiting an identity that was defined largely in terms of exclusion or oppression, led many people within minority communities to reject political blackness. This development was also influenced by the ongoing negotiation of relationships of first- and second-generation migrants to their countries of origin. Both qualitative studies and some limited quantitative data have suggested that the idea of an encompassing ‘black’ identity was always more popular amongst scholars and activists than it was amongst the majority of ethnic-minority Britons – with British Asians being especially resistant to such a label – even during the concept’s heyday (Alexander 2018; Modood 1994; 1997). Regardless of whether this was historically true, throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, groups of British Asians, Afro-Caribbeans, and others, increasingly embraced the idea that they each possessed unique and culturally-defined identities (Modood 1994; Modood and Werbner 1997), actively claiming that these identities provided a means of speaking back to popular cultural stereotypes. This embrace also enabled minorities to cultivate a sense of belonging that was uniquely their own, rather than one based on emulating white ‘Britishness’ – which, given the persistence of racial discrimination and economic disadvantage,
felt like an impossible and often undesirable challenge (Ali 1991; Gale and Hopkins 2009; Modood and Werbner 1997; Tarlo 2010). Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, the active embracing of distinct cultural identities, as part of a broader ‘tapestry’ of 'Britishness', was reinforced through a range of government initiatives and policies, as part of an official vision of multicultural Britain.

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Today, the language of explicit racism, where politicians and other public figures talk openly about irreconcilable racial divides or about Britain as a fundamentally white nation, has become increasingly marginal – still voiced by fringe politicians and prejudiced individuals, but stripped of mainstream respectability. This has clearly had a positive impact. In 2018, on the 50th anniversary of Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, the think tank British Future commissioned a national poll, which asked minority British people whether they thought today’s Britain was more or less prejudiced than it had been in 1968. Amongst people who had been alive in 1968, 73% of those who were aged 55-64 at the time of the poll, and 66% of those aged 65 or older, said they believed that things were better now (Ballinger 2018). Nonetheless, the logic of race – where groups are defined by innate characteristics and sorted within a hierarchy of claims to belonging and of values – continues to inflect our current conversations, albeit conducted in the language of ‘culture’, and hence it continues to shape opportunities for crafting a sense of identity and belonging amongst minorities. This is evident, for example, in the recent efforts of Jewish, Sikh and Muslim campaigners to have discrimination against their religious identities recognised as a form of racism.
White, but British?

For non-white minorities, ‘whiteness’ (and, most specifically, white-‘Englishness’) is often evoked as an unspoken and vaguely-defined standard, against which people are judged (Clarke and Garner 2009; Gilroy 2013). The status and understanding of whiteness have also taken on new meanings in relation to migration and diversity, since non-white migrants have settled in the UK in modern times and society has become more diverse.

Since World War II, and continuing to this day, migrants have often been actively recruited as cheaper sources of labour than the existing white-British working class (Hall et al 1978; May et al 2007). As a result, white working-class identities have been frequently positioned in opposition to immigration or multiculturalism. Today, many people in former working-class areas express a sense of double injustice: firstly at being undercut in the labour market; and secondly at being denied the sense of national cultural esteem that they feel minorities enjoy under official multiculturalism (Evans 2005; Tyler 2012). Meanwhile others, particularly in the younger generations, have come to emphasise a shared experience of exploitation or precariousness within the labour market, and to find in this grounds for solidarity and sympathy with minority groups (Tyler 2012).

More generally, diversity in Britain has produced a range of challenges for the white-British majority. In terms of national identity, the scholar Ian Baucom (1999) has written about how encounters with diversity, through Empire and migration, forced a reckoning with particular tensions within English and British identities. Competing commitments to liberalism and tradition, or to global-mindedness and connection to place, have had their delicate and often unspoken balance overturned by the presence of people from other backgrounds who relate to these elements of identity in different ways.
Meanwhile, on an individual level, social psychologists have shown how the presence of visible difference in society can often be experienced as threatening or disorienting. This is not simply a matter of prejudice, but a consequence of how we intuitively judge the potential for common understanding and co-operation with others, and the potential for visible difference to disrupt these processes. Nonetheless, social psychologists have also emphasised that these feelings of threat or disorientation during encounters with unfamiliar groups are not experienced uniformly within majority communities. They are mediated by factors such as the size, familiarity and ‘foreignness’ of the group, by dominant ways of imagining migration and its place within society, and by perceptions of how migrants either do, or do not, threaten social and economic interests (Brown et al. 2011; Dovidio and Esses 2001; Esses et al. 2002; Kosic 1999; Montreuil and Bourhis 2001).

Finally, within some geographical areas with strong minority presences, such as Brick Lane in London or Alum Rock in Birmingham, local politics and patterns of resource allocation – including access to council housing and funding for cultural initiatives – have fragmented along ethnic lines, creating new forms of tension and rivalry (Karner and Parker 2010; Young et al. 2011). There have also been suggestions that this is also having an impact at a national level, with diversity eroding support for British institutions and the welfare state (e.g. Goodhart 2004). Current evidence presents a more complex picture: although greater diversity is associated with diminished support for social welfare, in the UK and elsewhere, this is not necessarily motivated by a feeling that migrants do not ‘deserve’ access to state welfare (Eger and Breznau 2017).

Racial logic has also been applied to ostensibly ‘white’ groups: for example, Irish, Polish and Traveller communities all continue to face particular forms of stereotyping, stigma and exclusion. In common with broader tropes of cultural difference, the identities of people from other backgrounds who relate to these elements of identity in different ways.
of these groups are sometimes approached by the majority as though they are innate and unchangeable, and at other times as though they are simply a choice that people ought to be able to opt into or out of. For these ostensibly white groups, as well as for others who are seen to disrupt the dominant understandings of ‘culture’ – such as Romani communities – the idea of culture as a choice is sometimes given greater emphasis. This serves to exclude these groups from official multiculturalism and, in turn, from the rights and esteem attached to it (Cressy 2018; Eade et al 2006; Garner 2012; Ghaill 2000; Howe 2002; Kabachnik 2009).
Migration and diversity are part of the everyday fabric of life in the UK today. Even for people who do not live in diverse areas, diversity is visible through the media, political debates and everyday conversations. When thinking and talking about diversity, we often draw on familiar characterisations and framings of what this entails. These familiar ideas are known as ‘discourses’, and they equip us with tools for understanding and responding to the world around us, but they also colour our perceptions of the world and help to shape our values and guide our actions.

Today, explicit public attitudes towards diversity are more open and positive than they have been for much of the past half-century. At the same time, many members of minority groups continue to face prejudice and exclusion in their everyday lives. These experiences may not be the result of explicit public attitudes but of more subtle biases and prejudices, which, in turn, are often shaped by the discourses that characterise diversity in the UK today. By examining these discourses, we are better placed to understand not only how diversity is perceived by different people, but also how members of both majority and minority groups think of their lives, identities and senses of belonging in relation to diversity.

Why does public discourse matter?

Concepts such as race, citizenship, migration, multiculturalism or belonging acquire particular meanings based on how they are used within particular discourses. Multiple discourses can exist side-by-side, in an attempt to define the same concept. We might, for instance, identify a discourse where migration is seen as a source of strength. This discourse might be voiced and circulated
by certain policymakers, by community events that celebrate diversity such as carnivals, melas or Chinese New Years’ festivities, by grassroots organisations and by media outlets with a record of celebrating diversity. We might also identify a competing discourse, in which migration is framed as a threat, spread by different policymakers and activists, by mass events such as anti-migrant rallies or speeches, and by publications with anti-migrant editorial slants.

Discourses can have a powerful effect on how we think and act. For example, racist attitudes continue to exert a powerful influence on society today. A wide range of studies confirms that members of visible minorities experience notable disadvantage: in hiring and promotion; in the housing market; in treatment by public authorities, including by the police; in their experiences of service by private businesses; within workplace teams; and in the everyday behaviour of strangers, neighbours and even friends and family (see reviews in Bonilla-Silva 2013; Brewster and Rusche 2012; Cabinet Office 2017; Coates 2008; Essed 1991; Ndobo et al 2017; Quillian 2006). Yet we also know that people's explicit beliefs have generally grown less racist (Bonilla-Silva 2013; Ford 2008). The combination of these two trends suggests that, if racial inequality persists, then it does so predominantly on the basis of unconscious or, at least, covertly-held beliefs, which guide behaviour towards minorities. Social psychologists have documented the impact of everyday discourses on shaping these tacit beliefs and resulting behaviour (see McKinlay and McVittie 2009; van Dijk 2011). In turn, the logic of particular discourses can become embedded within particular institutional rules and structures, reinforcing themselves even in the absence of conscious or unconscious adherence.

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Prevailing discourses are not alone in shaping public sentiment. For instance, we know that people living in more rural areas, as well as those with fewer qualifications or in lower-skilled jobs, often hold stronger anti-migrant views (Rutter and Carter 2018). These views are often built on a foundation of everyday experience, where people of other nationalities are an unfamiliar sight, or where difficulties in finding employment create feelings of insecurity and persecution. These experiences can be interpreted in a variety of ways and public discourses offer us tools for making sense of them, which different people will use in different ways.

**Persistent concerns and mixed attitudes**

The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford charts trends around public attitudes towards migration. These records reveal that, between April 2006 and July 2008 (when the Great Recession struck), and again between June 2014 and September 2016 (the time of the EU Referendum campaign and the months immediately following the June 2016 vote), the British public ranked ‘immigration’ as the single most important issue facing Britain (Blinder and Richards 2018). Since 1994, immigration has consistently been named in the top five most important issues affecting this country. In addition, between 1964 (when public polling on immigration began) and about 2016, the majority of British respondents said they felt that there were too many immigrants in the UK. This figure did gradually decline over time, however, and since 2016, the proportion of those in agreement has been below 50%. In 2016, only 27% of respondents felt that immigration had made the UK a worse place to live (ibid). Reflecting a similar shift in opinions, a 2019 poll found that 48% of British respondents believed that ‘immigration has generally had a positive [...] impact on the United Kingdom’, whilst 26% believed it had generally had a negative impact – down from 64% in 2011 (BBC 2019; Ipsos-Mori 2019).

Although Brexit and the EU were reported as more pressing concerns in 2018, this does not necessarily mean that attention
shifted away from immigration. In fact, opposition to immigration was found to be the single strongest predictor of a ‘leave’ vote — suggesting that, for many, the Brexit referendum was understood primarily as a referendum on immigration (Clarke et al 2017). ‘Leave’ voters were also found to be even more strongly opposed to non-EU immigration than to EU immigration (Hix et al 2017). It has been suggested that expressing negative views on EU migrants, who tend to be white, has come to be seen as a more socially acceptable way of expressing fears about non-white immigration (ibid) 5.

In recent years, feelings about diversity and multiculturalism have been somewhat more mixed. In 2013, a Lord Ashcroft poll reported that 90% of the British public believed Britain to be a multicultural country, and 70% expressed support for multiculturalism. However, from the same sample, 43% of respondents claimed that diversity had ‘undermined British culture’ and 57% felt that ‘[t]here is an increasing amount of tension between the different groups living in Britain’ (Lord Ashcroft Polls 2013). Similar findings emerged from a 2017 poll, in which 60% agreed that ‘Diversity is a good thing for British culture’, whilst the remaining 40% expressed ambivalence or disagreed (Rutter and Carter 2018). A separate 2018 poll, however, found only 37% agreeing that ‘multiculturalism has a positive effect…on British culture’, and 43% agreeing that ‘Britain is a successful multicultural society where people from different backgrounds generally get along well together’ (Carter and Lowles 2018). Meanwhile, a 2010 poll of nearly 100,000 British adults found that only 24% agreed with the idea that, ‘Greater diversity is a source of strength to our society, and means that British identity continues to evolve – which is a good thing.’ In contrast, 67% agreed with statements that captured a sense of tension between diversity and a fundamental British identity (Darlington et al 2010). These findings vary, but they suggest that between one- and two-thirds of Britons believe there to be some form of antagonistic relationship between diversity and British culture and identity.
Finally, when it comes to opinions around race, a recent survey found that 26% of Britons admitted to being ‘very’ or ‘a little’ prejudiced towards people of other races (Kelley et al 2017). However, once again, responses to more specific questions varied. When asked, ‘Are some races or ethnic groups born less intelligent?’, only 18% of participants agreed, whereas, when asked, ‘Are some races or ethnic groups born harder working?’, 44% agreed. As the authors noted, this variation was mostly likely linked to an awareness that it is socially unacceptable to publicly share negative prejudices towards other groups, especially on issues of race. More generally, the well-documented trend of under-reporting prejudices that are seen to be socially unacceptable or politically incorrect (Bonilla-Silva 2013) should serve as a note of caution when interpreting any of the data presented here.

Finally, even when the rejection of overt racist attitudes is sincere, this may not extend to the rejection of all forms of stereotype, bias or inequality which serve to exclude minorities. Golliwogs are a good example of this: whilst many are familiar with them from classic British children’s literature, as a trinket or as an image used by brands, the golliwog character was originally based on a minstrel – a white performer wearing blackface, and with exaggerated features and behaviour intended to mock and demean black people (Pilgrim 2012). Whilst minorities may recognise how golliwogs reinforce familiar forms of racial mockery and stereotypes, the majority of British people do not; a 2017 poll found that 63% of the public stated that ‘it is not racist’ to sell or display golliwogs, whilst a further 17% were unsure (Bale 2017).

‘I’m not racist but…’: Public discourses of diversity

The public conversation around diversity is multifaceted, with no single, dominant discourse. Moreover, individuals, organisations, media outlets and political parties almost inevitably draw on more than one discourse when thinking about or characterising
diversity. As a result, existing discourses are never clear-cut. They often borrow from, depend upon or get mixed up with other discourses. Nevertheless, we can best decipher how diversity is understood today by examining some simplified, ‘typical’ discourses that are prominent in the UK:

- **Racism:** A belief that members of a physically-identifiable group share certain innate characteristics, and that such characteristics determine their position within a hierarchy of belonging and societal value. Overt racist sentiment has declined significantly in British society, but it is still present, even amongst mainstream voices, within local communities and on a national stage. MPs allegedly referring to Travellers as ‘a disease’ (Green 2019), non-white children as young as seven being heckled with monkey noises whilst playing school or community football (BBC 2019), or the persistent online harassment faced by the Jewish MP Luciana Berger – which has included an organised effort dubbed the ‘Filthy Jew Bitch Campaign’ by the white supremacists leading it (Press Association 2016) – all serve as recent examples. As the case of Luciana Berger suggests, racism can shade into other forms of prejudice in ways that can often be hard to disentangle. This is partly because the logic of racism, with its assumption of innate group characteristics, can come to characterise ways of thinking and talking about culture, class, religion, gender and sexuality.

6. Theories of race are not our only source for ideas of innateness. Notably, prominent ideas about gender and about sexuality can also reinforce the idea that particular characteristics are innate to a given group. However, it is also clear that women, men, and/or sexual minorities of colour, experience forms of gender- or sexuality-based prejudice that are distinct from their white counterparts. This highlights the ways in which the logic of racism can inflect other forms of judgement.

Whilst racism is most commonly understood as an overtly held belief, today scholars tend to argue that racism takes several distinct forms. In addition to being an explicit belief system, racism can also be understood as a structural, institutional and unconscious phenomenon. Structural racism entails the ways in which forms of advantage or disadvantage, dignity and belonging are distributed by the ordering of physical environments and dominant cultures. For example, if areas with more minorities receive less funding and support for schools, or if, culturally, we have fewer examples of non-native English speakers succeeding in business, and so we find it harder to trust somebody’s expertise when they speak with an accent, these may operate as forms of structural racism. Institutional racism
entails institutional practices, rules or values which serve to discriminate between people, without the need for individuals within institutions to consciously subscribe to them. When the Macpherson Report found the Metropolitan Police to be institutionally racist, it was referring to a range of practices and procedures that disproportionately targeted BAME (Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic) people and afforded them different treatment. Finally, racism may take the form of unconscious biases, which may be held even by people who reject overtly racist beliefs. The well-documented phenomenon in which having a minority-sounding name on a CV reduces one’s chances of being invited to interview (Zschirnt and Ruedin 2016) is a good example of unconscious bias in action. Unconscious bias may also involve the association of certain feelings, such as fear or pity, with particular groups. These non-overt forms of racism continue to pose a significant challenge for minorities living in the UK today (see section 4).

These different forms share the common label of ‘racism’, both because they are all involved in shaping unequal outcomes for minorities, and because, whilst they operate in distinct ways, they also frequently reinforce one another. For example, structural inequalities in access to education may help to shape an unconscious assumption that minorities are less capable, and such an assumption might then draw focus away from identifying and redressing structural inequalities. Collectively, these different types of racism all play a role in reinforcing a discourse of racial difference and hierarchy. However, referring to all these forms as ‘racism’ also poses a challenge, in that popular understandings of racism tend to only identify the term with explicit, individually-held beliefs (Salter et al 2018 and see Smith 2018). If structural, institutional or unconscious racism are described as ‘racism’, there is a risk that those claims might be interpreted as charges of explicit prejudice – prompting defensiveness and misunderstanding, and potentially hindering collaborative efforts.

- **Cosmopolitanism**: These discourses remain open to differences, as a source of strength, enrichment or pleasure.
They can be grounded in the experience of a specific place, or a set of connections, and researchers have found forms of cosmopolitanism adopted by a range of different class, national and local groups (Datta 2009; Massey 1995; Werbner 2006; 2008). Nonetheless, cosmopolitanism is often popularly associated with elite culture and ‘rootlessness’, and positioned in opposition to national identity.

- **Multiculturalism**: Multicultural discourses see identity and society as being made up of a patchwork of more-or-less distinct cultures. Since the 1990s, it has become common to describe British society as multicultural, although the term has increasingly taken on a negative connotation (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Critics of multiculturalism have pointed out that the idea of fundamentally distinct cultures can provide the foundation for suggesting that some cultures have a greater right to belong to a nation than others, that cultural groups are defined by distinct and irreconcilable interests, or that individuals are likely to possess particular positive or negative traits based on whichever cultural group they appear to belong to.

- **Hybridity**: Discourses of hybridity frame society and identity as creative mixtures, made up of many different cultural components. Instead of a multicultural patchwork, or a cosmopolitan commitment to openness, hybrid identities are understood as a particular blend of specific components, which then take on a life and value of their own (Werbner and Modood 1997).

- **Conviviality**: The term 'conviviality' comes from Latin roots, meaning ‘to live with’. Discourses of conviviality treat difference as neither something to be actively embraced, nor as a threat or a challenge, but simply as an ordinary fact of life. Convivial discourses often emphasise a ‘live and let live’ approach (Nowicka and Vertovec 2014).

- **Tolerance**: These discourses suggest that difference is acceptable or valued, to the extent that it is sanctioned by a majority group or by those in power. Discourses of tolerance simultaneously position minorities as perpetual outsiders,
whose licence to be different may be revoked at any time, and those doing the tolerating as more authentic in their belonging. Tolerance is often tied to calls for assimilation, where minority groups are expected to become more like majority ones (Hage 1994; 2012).

- **Utilitarianism:** These discourses value diversity in terms of specific and often measurable outcomes, which are predominantly economic – for example, the number of jobs taken from local workers, the levels of benefits claimed, or the contributions that immigrants make to tax or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Tatli 2011).

- **Communitarianism:** Discourses of communitarianism value diversity in relation to its impact on social solidarity and feelings of community, both at a local and a national level. In some cases, migrants have been seen as enriching communities, by making them more vibrant or cultivating new forms of care (Hickman et al. 2012). In other instances, however, the presence of different languages, cultures and social or economic priorities has been blamed for eroding community solidarity. Likewise, the formation of segregated minority communities can be threatening to social solidarity at a national level, as segregated groups may not buy into a broader British identity, or into British institutions (Holmes 2000; Worley 2005).

- **Colour-blindness:** This involves a belief that race no longer plays a significant role in shaping life in the UK. For instance, 74% of Britons do not believe themselves to be prejudiced towards people of other races (Kelley et al 2017). As such, it may be hard for this majority to believe that prejudice plays a role in the experiences of others. Assertions that the UK is not a racist country appear frequently within public debate (e.g. Mann 2018; Murray 2018). 'Colour-blind' discourses often suggest that, if members of minority groups continue to experience disadvantage or discrimination, these experiences are effectively a product of their individual choices – such as their residential choices, or the choice to embrace a particular culture – and can be overcome through personal effort or by taking different
courses of action. As such, discourses of colour-blindness often reject systematic or political explanations for disadvantage or discrimination (Lentin 2009).

• **Nativism:** This suggests that only members of a certain group – marked by particular characteristics, such as skin colour, or a particular set of cultural traits – belong in a specific place, or are entitled to certain rights by virtue of being citizens (Malkki 1992). Nativist beliefs are often associated with nationalist political movements, but they may also find mainstream expression. In the UK, a 2017 poll found that 47% of participants were in favour of banning all further immigration from Muslim countries, suggesting that those respondents felt there was no place for any additional Muslim presence in the UK (Goodwin et al 2017).

Nativism can also take more subtle forms. For example, alongside the roughly 3.8 million men recruited from within the UK to serve in World War I, around 3 million additional soldiers came from British colonies and dominions, including 1.5 million from India alone (Das 2014). Whilst World War I is often commemorated as a formative experience in modern British identity, such commemoration has often overlooked the presence and experiences of dominion and colonial troops – and especially non-white troops (Sherwood 2018; Smyth 2016). The exclusion of minority groups, cultures and values from stories, images and ideas of what it means to be 'British' operates as a subtle form of nativism, reinforcing a message that only some people genuinely qualify as British.

• **Localism:** Localist discourses privilege local neighbourhoods or communities as sites of identity and belonging. Sometimes, change at the local level evokes a sense of the whole nation being under threat whilst, in other cases, diverse local forms of community can cultivate broader feelings of conviviality or openness. However, it is also possible for people to cultivate inclusive local identities alongside more exclusive ideas of national belonging, or vice versa (Back 1996; Evans 2016; Wessendorf 2014).
• Post-imperial nostalgia: A 2014 poll found that 59% of Britons felt that the British Empire was something to be proud of, and 49% agreed that it left the countries it colonised better off than they had been pre-colonisation – in contrast to 19% who felt ashamed of Empire, and 15% who felt it left colonised countries worse off (Dahlgreen 2014). Ideas of British pride, greatness and relevance on the world stage are still strongly associated with the British Empire (Barnett 2017; Gilroy 2004). Meanwhile, the detrimental impacts of Empire are largely absent from the school curriculum and from popular media (Osler 2009; The Secret Teacher 2018). When the lingering political and economic consequences of Empire are overlooked, it is easier to believe that Britain bears little responsibility for, or connection with, the global inequalities and gaps in opportunities that often motivate migration (Duffield 2010; Gilroy 2004). This partisan re-telling of history can also encourage a belief that British attitudes and policies have always been innately benevolent and ‘civilising’, which draws attention away from the consequences of political choices that impact on minorities (Gilroy 2004).

A diverse conversation

No one discourse on diversity dominates the British conversation. In fact, as several polls reveal, individuals themselves often express contradictory views, depending on how they are prompted to think about diversity. Today, it is clear that overtly racial prejudices have declined significantly in the population as a whole, whilst migration remains a significant concern. Multiculturalism inspires a mix of both positive and negative attitudes. However, there is evidence from recent polls and other quantitative studies that the British public might hold more prejudiced views than it is willing to directly admit (Bonilla Silva 2014; Reilly 2012; Rutter and Carter 2018).

The wide range of everyday, public and government discourses around diversity provides a means of grappling with challenges related to migration and diversity, such as transformations in the fabric of communities, or the changing nature of the labour
market. Some of the prevalent discourses influence how we see diversity in the first place, characterising it as a tapestry of distinct cultures, a competition between racially-defined groups, a hybrid mix, or simply as a non-issue. These same discourses often suggest particular value judgements about diversity. Finally, further discourses serve to position how members of the public relate to diversity – by framing it as more or less of a political issue, by ascribing or denying responsibility, and by suggesting different stakes. Each one of us, in our own way, will draw on these discourses in trying to understand the world, in shaping our sense of identity, and in engaging with others.

'It is clear that overtly racial prejudices have declined significantly in the population as a whole... However, there is evidence from recent polls and other quantitative studies that the British public might hold more prejudiced views than it is willing to directly admit.'
Identities, and the feelings of belonging that accompany them, are not only shaped by public discourse, but by everyday experiences. These experiences, in turn, are often the products of broader social and economic forces. Income inequality, residential patterns, differences in access to education or jobs, differential treatment by the police and justice system, and local organisations and culture all play a role in shaping how feelings of belonging emerge and take root, or in influencing how individuals and groups come to experience threats or insecurities in relation to everyday community life. For example, difficulties in finding employment undermine a sense of collective belonging for both white- and minority-Britons. Likewise, the feeling that other local groups are attracting more public support than one’s own can challenge feelings of belonging to, or solidarity with, one’s neighbourhood or city. Meanwhile, local organisations and culture can play a positive role in building new forms of belonging, by creating connections between individual lives and broader patterns of diversity.

'Income inequality, residential patterns, differences in access to education or jobs, differential treatment by the police and justice system, and local organisations and culture all play a role in shaping how feelings of belonging emerge and take root, or in influencing how individuals and groups come to experience threats or insecurities in relation to everyday community life.'

Segregation: myth or reality?

In late May 2001, violent riots broke out in the struggling, post-industrial town of Oldham, following several weeks of escalating tensions, demonstrations and attacks between white and Asian residents. In the following months, Burnley and Bradford also saw highly damaging riots, following similar lines of division between Asians and whites. In response, the Government
commissioned a series of reports into the causes of these riots. 'The Ritchie Report' (2001) focused on Oldham, 'The Ouseley Report' (2001) on Bradford, and 'The Cantle Report' (2001) on the disturbances as a whole. All three reports found that segregation between Asian and white residents played a major role in fostering the deep resentment that had led to the riots. In Bradford and Oldham, certain neighbourhoods were widely known as white or Asian ‘no-go areas’, with these reputations upheld through racist graffiti and occasional violence. Schools were found to be highly segregated, whilst access to employment, public services and public office was also frequently mediated along racial lines. These reports revealed that segregation was a source of significant frustration for local people – with each group having cultivated parallel myths about the relative privilege and unwillingness to mix on the part of the other.

Based on these findings, The Cantle Report raised concerns about segregated communities living ‘parallel lives’ at a national scale. It triggered a lively conversation around the extent, causes and consequences of minority-group segregation in the UK. However, despite official pronouncements that Britain has ‘sleepwalk[ed] into segregation’ (Philips quoted in Brown and Judd 2005), other researchers have been more measured and ambivalent about the extent of such segregation. Residential and school segregation vary significantly across regions, as well as within groups. Perceptions of segregation or inequality do not always measure up to reality: for instance, in Oldham, white residents speaking to The Ritchie Report team claimed that the majority of funding for neighbourhood regeneration went to Asian-dominated areas, whereas, in fact, the significant majority of regeneration funding was going to white-dominated neighbourhoods (Ritchie 2001).

'The general trend in the UK has been towards the residential de-segregation of both minority and white-British groups, as both have come to live in increasingly mixed areas.'
The general trend in the UK has been towards the residential de-segregation of both minority and white-British groups, as both have come to live in increasingly mixed areas (Peach 2009; Catney 2015). De-segregation takes place as migrants of varied backgrounds move into certain areas, making them more diverse, and as settled minorities or white-British citizens move from areas in which their own group makes up a large proportion of the population to others in which it is proportionally smaller. However, evidence suggests that, while segregation is generally on the decline, smaller subsets of minority and white-British populations have become more segregated (Poulsen and Johnston 2006). In cases in which segregation has increased, the result has rarely been US-style ‘enclaves’, where a single group makes up 90% or more of the population. Rather, for the minority of minorities who do become more segregated, the tendency is to shift from white-dominated areas to areas dominated by a mix of different minority groups (ibid; Carling 2008; Johnston et al 2010; Peach 2009).

School segregation appears to follow a similar trend, with a long-term decline in overall segregation over time being marked by shorter periods or geographic pockets in which segregation has in fact increased (Fitz et al 2010). More segregated areas seem to be associated with the development of cultures of blame and resentment, whether this comes from segregated white majorities who lack contact with minorities, or from segregated minorities who lack contact with the majority (Cantle 2001; Flint and Robinson 2008).

Evidence suggests that both patterns of migration and the make-up of neighbourhoods are shaped by previous networks of relationships, support and knowledge (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara 2010; Haug 2008; Robertson et al 2010; Wilson 1994). Similar approaches have been applied to particular segregated neighbourhoods in the UK, in order to make the argument that segregation needs to be understood in connection to longer-term imperial histories, political struggles or patterns of inclusion and exclusion (Amin 2003; Bagguley and Hussain 2012). More generally, we can also better understand minorities’ experiences...
of belonging to particular places, or within particular visions of what it means to be British, in relation to such factors.

**Systems of advantage and disadvantage**

In 2017, the UK Government published the initial findings of its first systematic audit into race-based inequalities in the UK. Together with findings from the Equality and Human Rights Commission, published in 2015⁹, the resulting report revealed that many minority groups continue to face systematic disadvantage whilst, in certain aspects of life, a few minority groups have managed to catch up with, or even surpass, the white-British population.

In the 2011 UK Census, 80.5% of the population identified as ‘white-British’, while the remaining 19.5% identified as belonging to another ethnic group. Within these groups, 77% of ‘white-British’ residents of working age were employed. The only group to exceed this was ‘white-other’¹⁰, at 81%. In other ethnic groups, employment levels in the working-age population were: 77% for people of Indian origin; 67% for people identifying as ‘black’ (including Afro-Caribbean and African origin), 64% for people of Chinese origin, 62% for those selecting ‘other’ ethnic origin; and 55% for people of Pakistani or Bangladeshi origins. Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers were also more likely than any of the other ethnic groups to be in low-skilled, low-paying occupations. Meanwhile, there were fewer ‘white-British’ people in low-skilled and low-income employment than members of most other groups.

In terms of income, white workers were found to earn around 50 pence per hour more than the average within ethnic minority groups. During the period of 2008 to 2013, several ethnic and religious minority groups saw their income fall at a faster rate than either the national average or the white majority, including people identifying as black, those of ‘mixed’ ethnicity, Sikhs and Muslims. Most minority groups were also much more likely than the white majority to be living in persistent poverty (defined as having an income below 60% of the national median for three of
the previous four years), with 20% of people from Asian, black or other ethnic backgrounds in persistent poverty, but only 8% of those identifying as white.

White-British, Indian and Pakistani households all had relatively high rates of homeownership, at 68%, 68% and 64%, respectively. Meanwhile, only 21% of ‘black-African’, 32% of ‘white-other’, and 39% of Bangladeshi, Chinese or ‘black-Caribbean’ households were homeowners. Social housing allocations and tenure were skewed slightly towards minority groups, with minorities making up 21% of both. Thanks in part to lower incomes, ethnic minority households in social or private-rented housing were spending a higher proportion of their incomes on rent. Minority groups were also more likely than average to live in overcrowded or substandard housing, with Bangladeshi households having an unusually high rate of overcrowding (30%) and Pakistani or Arab households having unusually high rates of substandard housing (29% and 34%, respectively).

Children of Indian origin, and those identifying as ‘mixed-white-Indian’, outperformed white-British children in terms of learning outcomes at the age of five, although, by GCSE level, pupils of Bangladeshi, ‘other-Asian’, Chinese, mixed or ‘white-Irish’ ethnic origin also outperformed white-British children. Poverty, which is typically measured in terms of eligibility for free school meals, is understood to have a significant impact on educational outcomes. This seems to make a larger difference for white-British students than for members of most other ethnic groups.

Experiences of dealing with public institutions also varied according to ethnic origin. A significant majority of each ethnic group reported positive experiences of dealing with GPs, with black-African, white-Irish and white-British patients reporting the highest levels of satisfaction. However, documented differences in treatment also exist. Black and Asian women are significantly more likely than others to experience common mental health disorders. However, even when accounting for this, people of black ethnic origin are still much more likely to be

II. Officially termed ‘non-decent’ housing, defined as: ‘not in a reasonable state of repair, lacking reasonably modern facilities and services, or with ineffective insulation or heating’.
detained and sectioned under the Mental Health Act than those of white ethnic origin.

Similarly, people from ethnic minorities are three times as likely to be stopped and searched by the police (for people of black ethnic origin, this climbs to six times more likely). Black defendants, and particularly black men, are more likely to be denied bail, whilst those of white ethnic origin are the least likely to be kept in custody prior to trial. Despite this, the rate of convictions for all minority groups is lower than that for the white population. A recent government review found that, when convicted for drug offences, defendants from a minority ethnic background were 240% more likely to receive a prison sentence than defendants of white ethnicity (Lammy 2017). People identifying as having black or mixed ethnicity were less likely than those identifying as white to have confidence in the local police (71% and 70% respectively, versus 78%).

'Official multiculturalism policies, as well as unofficial cultures around dealing with difference, can produce further unequal outcomes, in terms of interactions with public institutions.'

Official multiculturalism policies, as well as unofficial cultures around dealing with difference, can produce further unequal outcomes, in terms of interactions with public institutions. In Rotherham, where a long-running and highly organised ring of child sexual exploitation was uncovered, largely within the Pakistani community, local government approaches to community relations were found to have exacerbated the issue. Officials prioritised working with established, predominantly male community leaders in their community relations, including when raising concerns about child sexual exploitation. Meanwhile, local politicians expressed a reluctance to confront the issue, out of fears that it might ignite racial tensions. This approach made it difficult for women and other members of the community to access authorities and support, in order to raise concerns about the perpetrators or to report cases of abuse.
Similarly, in 2015, the Government updated its definition of Gypsies (Roma) and Travellers for planning purposes, to include only those who were continually moving. In turn, charities and campaigners have raised concerns that this policy seems to have led to the under-provision of authorised encampment sites. By no longer counting those who are temporarily settled in one place as ‘Gypsy’ or ‘Traveller’, and by failing to pay attention to patterns of movement between partially-settled and mobile communities, a ‘housing crisis’ has emerged, with a significant growth in unauthorised and unfit encampment (Perraudin 2018). In both cases, narrow definitions of ethnicity and ethnic interests, and a failure to take account of internal group diversity, caused harm for members of the groups involved, as well as for relationships between these groups and wider society.

Finally, the UK race disparity audit revealed that people from all ethnic groups reported a strong sense that the area in which they lived was a place where ‘people from different backgrounds got on together’, with the lowest score (78%) reported by people identifying as black or ‘other’ ethnic origin. Likewise, a majority of all groups, apart for the ‘other’ group (at 44%), felt ‘fairly strongly’ or ‘very strongly’ that they ‘belonged to their neighbourhood’. Feelings of belonging to Britain were even higher. However, this does not necessarily suggest that members of ethnic minority groups consider life in the UK to be fair: in a separate poll, 56% of minority respondents agreed with the statement, ‘In Britain today, people from some backgrounds will never have a real chance to be successful, no matter how hard they work’, and one in five (20%) of minority respondents agreed strongly (Lord Ashcroft Polls 2013).

**Organising belonging**

Patterns of income, housing, education and institutional relations set the broad parameters for how different groups experience life in the UK. On an everyday level, however, this experience is transformed through the people, institutions and places that
shape the everyday lives of migrants, in different locations. Arriving in a new country, or even in a new neighbourhood, can be a daunting experience. A range of academic studies has pointed to the role of community and local organisations in fostering a sense of belonging within minority groups. Whether from within the communities themselves, or through close connections with them, local organisations can help to bridge the gap between existing values, perspectives and experiences, and those of the new or changing area – for both majority and minority groups (Lampert 2009; Vertovec 2004).

‘Patterns of income, housing, education and institutional relations set the broad parameters for how different groups experience life in the UK. On an everyday level, however, this experience is transformed through the people, institutions and places that shape the everyday lives of migrants, in different locations.’

To take just one example, of Somalis in the UK, new local community organisations – which are often set up to maintain links to traditional cultures, practices or clan affiliations – can end up providing a means of learning language, accessing state support, coming to understand British culture, and building attachments to place. Over time, many of these organisations also transform themselves in order to remain relevant to contemporary experiences of life in the UK. For example, they can help to negotiate changes in household gender dynamics, or to foster new friendships amongst previously-divided clan groups, ultimately generating new feelings of belonging to the areas in which they operate (Hopkins 2006; Hammond 2013; Lindley 2010; McGown 1999; Samanani 2014).

Organisations can also work to build a sense of common belonging amongst multiple groups as evidenced, for example, by Near Neighbours, an initiative run by the Church of England’s ‘Church Urban Fund’, which sponsors local projects that provide venues for interaction amongst residents of diverse areas (Cohen et al 2013). A large and influential body of research on
'contact theory' has demonstrated that contact with members of unfamiliar groups, or in some cases even imagined contact, can reduce mistrust, build empathy and transform perceptions (see Hewstone and Swart 2011 for a summary). Crucially, however, such contact works best under certain conditions, such as when people are able to form stronger and longer-term relationships, or when those meeting one another retain clear markers of their group identity, and so remain noticeability different throughout the encounter.

Community organisations can act as key venues, not only for contact between different groups, but for facilitating particular forms of contact that can build shared understandings and collective belonging. Such work can be time-intensive, however, and requires other key resources as well, including the space to meet and effective facilitation. In addition, the benefits of contact may not be apparent to those who have never previously experienced it. This can make it challenging to engage people in, and to support, such work. To address these challenges, there is a need to draw upon existing resources, local knowledge and connections, and upon moral commitments to building stronger bonds. Faith communities may have an especially key role to play here, as they are often places in which many of these elements for effective contact can be found.

'...local cultures, spread through subtle, everyday experiences, can also play an important role in creating a sense of belonging. People often notice how others respond to their public presence, even if only unconsciously.'

Many people do not have links to these kinds of formal organisations, but local cultures, spread through subtle, everyday experiences, can also play an important role in creating a sense of belonging. People often notice how others respond to their public presence, even if only unconsciously. Over-long glances,
or the tense squaring of shoulders as someone passes by, can send subtle signals that communicate doubt as to belonging or equality, just as smiles or simple, indifferent treatment can signal welcome or acceptance. The condition of streets and parks, the signs on businesses, and the behaviour of others can likewise signal the prospects for acceptance and belonging, or else hint at tension and discord (Watson 2006; Wessendorf 2014; Wise and Velayutham 2009). These unconscious feelings, generated by everyday experience, have been identified as important factors in creating a sense of segregation, ‘no-go’ zones, or discomfort around those who are different (Amin 2013; Swanton 2010). However, in other instances, positive unconscious impressions that persist over time can develop into localised forms of cosmopolitanism, conviviality or community, which bring people together across potential lines of difference (Back 1996; Baumann 1996; Hickman et al 2012; Samanani 2017). Shared reference points, such as local music scenes or the experience of multicultural markets, can help to anchor these local cultures (Baumann 1996; Williams 2017).

‘...positive unconscious impressions that persist over time can develop into localised forms of cosmopolitanism, conviviality or community, which bring people together across potential lines of difference.’

Potential gaps between public acceptance and private attitudes, and the persistence of unconscious bias, together pose a continued challenge. Whilst there has been a general decline in overt racism over the past half-century, it is not clear whether this decline is due to a genuine shift in personal opinion or a shift in public norms, as a result of which overt racism is considered less acceptable to voice. Academic evidence (Meyers and Williamson 2001) suggests that majority groups are significantly more willing to express prejudiced views in private than in
public. In the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire, the MP Emma Dent Coad spoke in the House of Commons about the racist tropes she would often hear senior council officials use to refer to the diverse residents of Grenfell and the surrounding areas, both before and after the fire, painting a picture of the sorts of statements made behind closed doors (Speare-Cole 2019). Both private prejudice and the persistence of unconscious bias (see pages 28-30) may motivate members of both majority and minority groups to avoid unfamiliar others and, in so doing, limit the potential for organisations and everyday contact to build shared understandings and feelings of belonging.

Concerns around safety may also deter groups from engaging with local organisations and services, or from being in public spaces at all. For example, a study looking at hate crime data between August 2014 and May 2016 found that 74% of the recorded hate crimes occurred in public streets or buildings (Walters and Krasodomski-Jones 2018). In a large-scale study of hate crime victims in Leicester, 28% of victims stated that experiencing hate crime made them avoid certain areas, while 22% said that the experience made them want to move house (Chakraborti et al 2014).

'Whilst there has been a general decline in overt racism over the past half-century, it is not clear whether this decline is due to a genuine shift in personal opinion or a shift in public norms, as a result of which overt racism is considered less acceptable to voice. Academic evidence suggests that majority groups are significantly more willing to express prejudiced views in private than in public.'
New identities

As migrants move and settle, their identities often change; even those who maintain a strong sense of connection to their places of origin may find that their relationships with these places are dramatically transformed. Meanwhile, second-, third- and fourth-generation immigrants tend to experience further transformations in identity. Over time, successive generations usually develop identities around the places in which they live (Cohen 2008). Rather than simply conforming to dominant identities, this process of adaptation tends to involve actively reimagining identities in line with local, national and transnational experiences – creating new hybrids and re-imaginings, which can also help to transform majority identities, in turn.

In many cases, local identities have moved beyond the boundaries of distinct national, ethnic or racial groups, allowing for new forms of understanding and social relations to emerge. Meanwhile, on the national stage, activists, public figures and others are working to assert new, more inclusive or open visions of Britain. Today, different groups are coming together around common issues, such as inequality, austerity or the status and treatment of refugees (Cohen et al 2017). However, despite these local and national efforts, important gaps remain that continue to position Britain’s minorities as ‘outsiders’, or to produce unequal outcomes across different groups. Meanwhile, minority groups also face internal struggles over how to frame identity, and about who gets included or excluded within such categories.

‘In many cases, local identities have moved beyond the boundaries of distinct national, ethnic or racial groups, allowing for new forms of understanding and social relations to emerge.’

Changing community dynamics

Migrant experiences vary widely, and so too do the experiences of new migrant communities. Bangladeshi communities in the
UK – made up of people who first arrived as Victorian-era sailors, later as Commonwealth migrants from Pakistan, and then, most significantly, to flee the destruction of the Bangladesh War of Independence – are chiefly from the Sylhet region of Bangladesh, and largely from particular villages within that region (Anitha and Pearson 2013). As a result, for many first-generation Bangladeshi immigrants, employment patterns, the exchange of goods, community dynamics and feelings of belonging are closely connected to life in these villages (Gardner 1993; Zeitlyn 2015). Meanwhile, for Somali migrants arriving in the 1990s and 2000s, distinctions between clans often took on a greater importance in the UK than in Somalia, as clan identities became a way of both holding onto traditional identities whilst abroad, and of making sense of the experiences of the Somali Civil War (Hopkins 2006; Samanani 2014). For Kurdish refugees and migrants arriving from dispersed regions across the Middle East, often with little connection to one another, life in the UK has enabled them to foster a stronger sense of unity and collective identity as a distinct, transnational group (Griffiths 2000).

'It is common for first-generation immigrants to believe that they will return to their countries of origin, later in life. All the while, these emotional attachments are transformed by the realities of living abroad.'

Despite these variations and nuances, common patterns of experiences are identifiable. For instance, many new immigrants retain strong emotional attachments to their places of origin. It is common for first-generation immigrants to believe that they will return to their countries of origin, later in life. All the while, these emotional attachments are transformed by the realities of living abroad. What was once a direct experience of a place and a way of life in the country of origin is now mediated through phone calls, text messages, remittances, satellite TV, community centres or occasional return trips, all of which transform relationships to place over time. For some groups, homelands
take on an imaginary, almost mythical status, divorced from the everyday reality of life there, as well as from ongoing historical and cultural transformations. This can lead to an intensified commitment towards religious, cultural or familial practices, or towards ethnic identities, which may have previously held less importance. On the other hand, some people feel that their attachment to homeland diminishes over time (Cohen 2008; Vertovec 2009).

These patterns also change across generations. The children of migrants, as well as those who migrate at a young age, grow up with a range of different formative experiences, some of which are drawn from mainstream life in the UK, and others from households that maintain particular relationships to their countries of origin – whether in their food, language, values, religious beliefs, family structures, social ties or otherwise. For latter-generation youth, these diverse experiences can sometimes lead to difficulties in experiencing or expressing a sense of belonging. On the one hand, experiences of ‘traditional’ cultures, values and relationships can be sources of tension or uncertainty, as younger generations grapple with the expectations of older generations, or struggle to feel at home within traditional environments. On the other hand, researchers have documented how, even for minorities who feel a strong sense of belonging to the UK, such attachment can be subject to continual challenges (subtle or overt), on the basis of race. For many, this means that they feel continually marked as ‘outsiders’ (Cohen 2008; Gardner 2012; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Skrbiš et al. 2007; Robinson 2009). These challenges elicit different responses: some people embrace new variations of their ethnic, religious or racial identities; some experiment with new ways of being British; and others try to find ways of juggling multiple belongings. These dynamics can generate new forms of openness and inclusion, as well as modes of closure or even fundamentalism. Almost inevitably, these new identities and feelings of belonging will be hybrids, drawing together a range of different experiences and ideas (Hall 1992; Werbner and Modood 1997).
These responses are not only a matter of personal choice: they are often shaped by government policy and the actions of different local, national and international organisations. For instance, in Southall, London, the persistence of strictly separated cultural identities amongst minority groups in the 1980s and 1990s was linked to local government policy. Historically, funding was allocated primarily to groups that could claim to represent distinct communities, rather than to those working across community lines. In turn, as ethnic identities became institutionalised, local politics, arts and charities also began to fragment along those lines. Meanwhile, everyday patterns of interaction remained partly mixed, and provided locals with some basis for imagining new identities beyond institutionalised divisions (Baumann 1996).

Local multiculture

Today, minority communities in Britain are marked by a high degree of creativity and diversity. These qualities mark ostensibly traditional movements, just as much as they mark attempts to explore new identities through art, or the rejection of identity labels altogether. In many cases, new identities no longer fit the neat labels of race, ethnicity or culture. The scholar Les Back (1996) has coined the term ‘multiculture’ to refer to a situation in which, instead of a tapestry of distinct cultures or identities (as in multiculturalism), there is a continuous and shifting mix of identifications and feelings of belonging, which becomes difficult to label or segment. These dynamics of ‘multiculture’ are often strongly grounded in particular places and are particularly likely to take shape in urban areas, where multiple forms of difference often come into contact with one another (Gidley 2013).

Another pattern has been the shift towards increasing individualism. Insofar as members of minority groups continue to identify with particular groups, religions or races, they often do so in ways that are increasingly personal and distinct from the identifications of others. For instance, young Muslims in Britain today voice a range of different Islamic identifications: some
They position themselves as secular or cultural Muslims, rejecting the religious dimensions; some connect Islam with different British political traditions, such as socialism or conservatism; some explore a range of different Islamic traditions across their lives; others connect to Islam primarily through art and music, through their choices as consumers, or through heritage; and others equate Islam with particular national or historical traditions (Abbas 2011; Barylo 2017; Glynn 2002; Samanani 2017). Across all of these variations, it becomes increasingly difficult to refer to the ‘Muslim community’, or even to plural ‘Muslim communities’, in any coherent or meaningful way.

'Another pattern has been the shift towards increasing individualism. Insofar as members of minority groups continue to identify with particular groups, religions or races, they often do so in ways that are increasingly personal and distinct from the identifications of others.'

As Back (1996) points out, these localised or personalised identities can produce both inclusion and exclusion, often at different scales. Locally, or within individual lives, these dynamics can foster a greater openness to difference, but they do not necessarily work to transform wider discourses or the beliefs they give rise to. Individuals can come to hold a mixture of open and closed attitudes, and behave differently in relation to the diverse others they encounter in everyday life, and in relation to the idea of diversity at a national level.

**Fragmentation?**

As minority identities have shifted, from an encompassing frame of political blackness, via a range of culturally-bounded identities, to a growing ‘multiculture’ of new, shifting and overlapping identities, the scope for political mobilisation has also changed. Activists and scholars have expressed concern that these shifts have fragmented opportunities for collective understanding.
and political action across minority groups, as these groups have turned inwards towards increasingly particular identities, and away from common structural challenges (Alexander 2018; Alexander et al. 2012). As with the question of political blackness, a lack of survey data makes it hard to assess whether these concerns are most prevalent amongst activists and academics, who are experiencing fragmentation amongst themselves, or whether they are more widely felt. It is broadly true however, that no encompassing political framework, equivalent to political blackness, currently exists, and that Britain has seen a proliferation of different cultural and religious organisations seeking to represent different forms of minority-community interest. It is also true that minority groups often experience varied social outcomes and face different institutional challenges, and that, over the past three decades, minority communities have become more aware of these divergences.

Nonetheless, evidence suggests that, in many cases, the divergent outcomes experienced by different minority groups share the same, or closely overlapping, root causes. For example, while different minority groups do experience distinct labour market or health outcomes, these outcomes often remain meaningfully distinct from those of the white-British majority, and will often change in step with one another, but not with the majority (see Figure 1 overleaf). This points towards common forces affecting outcomes across minority groups (Karlsen and Nazroo 2011; Jivraj and Simpson 2015).

'...in many cases, the divergent outcomes experienced by different minority groups share the same, or closely overlapping, root causes.'

These cross-cutting issues are being addressed by a range of national organisations that look at such challenges across different groups. However, in doing so, many organisations define themselves in terms of their core issue, rather than in terms of building coalitions of minority groups per se – whether
this issue is the stigma around mental health, access to housing, or racism in football. As with other new identity groupings, issue-focused coalitions have the potential both to bring new sets of people together and to fragment, reorient or remake existing groupings. As with political blackness, there are calls today for communities and activists to think in broader and more encompassing terms. For example, the Centre for Labour and Social Studies, a think tank founded in 2012, has been a prominent voice campaigning for a new understanding of class identity that is sensitive to, and encompassing of, ethnic differences.

Since the refugee crisis of 2015, a growing movement of organisations working to sponsor, protect and support refugees, and to fight for migrants' rights has likewise worked to position itself as an encompassing way of rethinking British racial politics. In many cases, religious identities – and particularly those of Islam – have come to serve as powerful collective identities, drawing together members of different ethnic groups, although encompassing religious organisations and groupings are
themselves plural and contested. It remains unclear whether, and how, individuals and communities will take up these wider banners.

**National claims**

There continues to be a lively conversation around the place and status of diversity in Britain. Today, a range of voices, within and across minority groups, are an active and influential part of this conversation, claiming space within national British identities for minority belongings, as well as challenging the ways in which such claims might be denied. Within publishing, the newly-founded Jhalak Prize joins the slightly-older ‘The Guardian 4th Estate Story Prize’ in showcasing outstanding ‘Black and Minority Ethnic’ writers on the national stage. Recent acclaimed books by writers such as Afua Hirsch, Reni Eddo-Lodge or the rapper Akala, or the edited collection of essays in *The Good Immigrant*, have vocally challenged the image of a colour-blind or tolerant Britain, by highlighting the ongoing struggles faced by many minorities around racism, identity and belonging. In the arts, following a review of equality and diversity in the English arts and culture sector (Parkinson et al 2014), Arts Council England has made a significant effort to support a wider diversity of artists and institutors (Gardner 2017). Across the cultural sector, some voices are calling for greater efforts to include people who are marked by difference, whilst others are advocating a move away from singling out particular categories of diversity, towards simply producing media that are capable of representing and resonating with the diverse and complex British population (Saha 2018).

Within higher education, following a range of student-led campaigns to ‘decolonise’ curricula, many universities are trialling funds and programmes to diversify teaching materials and approaches. From 2011 onwards, a series of UK government initiatives and reviews have pushed to increase diversity across the business community, and today there are some reports of changing norms, with diversity being valued increasingly by
investors and executives alike (Buckley et al 2018). Diversity within the House of Commons has, likewise, increased (Bengtsson et al 2018), whilst Parliament has improved its ability to identify and respond to the concerns of minority demographics – a shift which is partly linked to the diversification of parliamentarians (Saalfeld 2001). Across these domains, as in the arts and media, efforts to increase diversity and to better represent the concerns of a diverse populace are nothing new. Historically, these efforts have enjoyed mixed success, and in many cases the outcome of present efforts remains to be seen.

...new political coalitions are taking shape amongst and across minority groups. While ‘political blackness’ no longer provides a compelling political identity for many, issues of race remain high on the agenda for all kinds of grassroots and national groups...'

Meanwhile, new political coalitions are taking shape amongst and across minority groups. While 'political blackness' no longer provides a compelling political identity for many, issues of race remain high on the agenda for all kinds of grassroots and national groups – from those targeting practices of police ‘stop-and-search’, based on evidence of racial bias, to those aiming for more inclusive conversations and practices in the diagnosis and treatment of mental health. National and international crises, such as the recent Windrush Scandal or the ongoing Syrian war, have also inspired the emergence of new coalitions, campaigning on immigration reform and issues of refuge and asylum.

**Enduring gaps**

Today, Britain’s minority groups voice a strong sense of belonging, both to their local areas and to the UK. However, everyday life for these groups is also often marked by experiences of exclusion. Similarly, whilst the white-British majority has embraced diversity in certain ways, it continues to struggle with it in others. Neither majority nor minority groups are homogenous;
dynamics of identity, belonging and inclusion continue to vary widely within them. Local experiences offer opportunities for rethinking identities and belonging in more open and inclusive ways, but there are also limits to these processes, particularly in segregated areas, where local identities may become more insular or resentful, and the impact of inclusive local identities in transforming national discourses may be limited.

Explicit racism has declined in the UK. Yet, between individuals, in communities and neighbourhoods, and in various institutions, challenges still persist, linked to enduring forms of structural, institutional and unconscious racism. Part of the challenge for those seeking to push back on these drivers of inequality will be the question of how to name and discuss them in a way that speaks to both minority and majority experiences, and how to build a broad enough coalition for change.

"...there are still meaningful (if uneven) gaps in a range of social outcomes for many minority groups, including income, access to education, health, housing and justice."

Nationally, further tensions exist between a range of competing discourses, which imagine different configurations of inclusion and exclusion. Today, a broad range of equalities legislation exists to safeguard equal outcomes and the right to equal participation in public life for members of minority groups. However, despite this, there are still meaningful (if uneven) gaps in a range of social outcomes for many minority groups, including income, access to education, health, housing and justice. The creativity and dynamism of both minority groups, and that of the broader communities in which they live, offer a powerful resource for overcoming inequality and exclusion, but it is also clear that much more remains to be done.
2. Recommendations for communities, local and national government
Introduction

An earlier version of Part I of this report was shared with participants ahead of the two-day conference convened by Cumberland Lodge and The Runnymede Trust in November 2018. The following set of recommendations was developed through the ensuing roundtable conference discussions, as well as during an expert consultation with a smaller group of conference representatives and further specialists in May 2019.

People involved in this process included front-line practitioners, heads of charities, members of the civil service, faith leaders, journalists, local government representatives and academics. A full list of contributors to the conference discussions and subsequent consultation can be found on pages 71-73.

These suggestions are not intended as fully developed policy platforms or avenues of change, but as productive considerations to be incorporated into existing change-making and agenda-setting, at all levels.
Diagnosing discrimination and inequality

1. Pay attention to different causes of discrimination

Changes in social norms and increased legal protections have caused a decline in overt racism. To some extent, however, minorities may not always experience everyday life as less overtly hostile – thanks to the growing prominence of a small number of extremists who target minorities. Whilst there is a continued need to tackle these overt threats, meaningful change will not come from focusing questions of discrimination and inequality around overt racism alone.

Lingering inequalities seem more closely tied to forms of structural, institutional and unconscious racism. These forms of racial exclusion can also work to legitimise or motivate overt racism. Addressing these underlying forces, however, requires confronting racism as a systemic phenomenon, and interrogating commonplace language, norms, practices, rules and behaviours for their potential to exclude. In local efforts and public policy it remains an open question of how best to name and redress these issues. Naming matters both for recognising experiences of inequality and for building broad coalitions.

2. Look at both personal cases and overall trends

To address implicit bias and systemic and institutional inequality more effectively, there is a need to connect particular experiences with general trends. Organisations should still attend to members’ experiences of discrimination, harassment or unequal treatment, but should also strive to gain a broader overview of any such trends. Disparity audits remain one of the best tools for this. Organisations need to be prepared for such audits to reveal problems that are more systemic than localised – connected to organisational culture or structure, rather than necessarily to particular individuals or single practices – and they should feel able to take action at an appropriate scale. Likewise,
organisations should expect such changes to take time to bed-in, and should be wary of solutions that focus on the short term. Given that these are wide-scale problems, policymakers should also think about how to co-ordinate good practices and aligned outcomes in conducting and acting on disparity audits.

3. **National audits and public platforms matter**

At a national level, audits of inequality may, likewise, play an important role. National culture, media and education, as well as the representativeness of public bodies, such as Parliament, should also be subject to careful scrutiny. Nationally-visible institutions and media, and formative influences such as education, play a strong role in shaping bias, and subtle forms of exclusion or discrimination expressed by these bodies, and within these processes, may have an outsized effect.

4. **Distinguish carefully between legitimate and overly prejudiced concerns around diversity**

Increasing diversity comes with legitimate challenges in reconciling different understandings, values and beliefs; but organisations and policymakers need to exercise caution in parsing public concern. Both legitimate and prejudiced concerns may be phrased in similar language, and the expression of legitimate worries may, likewise, be tinted by prejudicial belief. There is a risk that actors using the language of legitimate concerns and public dialogue may be doing so, consciously or unconsciously, in bad faith, as a way of masking or expressing existing and inflexible prejudices, rather than from any desire to find consensus.

Local and national government, media and public organisations can all play an important role in mediating these concerns. Sometimes, this will require work to create a willingness to collaborate, before addressing substantial issues themselves. Such mediation may also require multi-dimensional responses, where efforts are made both to tackle the substance of public concerns as well as the prejudicial biases that might be colouring them.
5. Build relationships, and embrace pluralism

Members of minority communities have a crucial role to play in identifying, diagnosing and acting on inequality and discrimination, but reliance upon such communities or their representatives must be carefully managed. The current dynamics of identity formation means that, increasingly, no one organisation or network can claim to represent a minority group, whether locally or nationally. 'Tick-box' approaches to identity are no longer likely to work. Government and organisations, locally and nationally, must be careful not to create unofficial gatekeepers or spokespersons, when such practices risk excluding other voices. A stronger approach would be to actively attempt to engage multiple organisations and networks from within any given minority group.

Finally, important differences between minority communities, based on region, ethnicity, faith, generation and income, should be acknowledged, and the engagement of certain communities should not be assumed to represent the engagement of minorities as a whole. Working processes should have adequate time and facilitation to explore and establish a sense of shared purpose that runs through acknowledged differences. Trusted third parties can also play a role in mediating between contending interests and in identifying neglected voices.

6. Inequality and discrimination are also problems for majorities to act on

More generally, inequality and discrimination need to be seen not simply as problems impacting on minorities, but as issues that deeply implicate majorities as well. Minority groups, or their representatives, should not be made solely responsible for driving organisational or political change, nor should they be made to bear the brunt of such developments. Instances of segregation, divided communities or inter-community prejudice need to be investigated with sensitivity to existing distributions of power, resources and security, and the work of change needs to be shared out in relation to such factors.
Driving effective change

1. Speak to existing values and focus on potential

Efforts to engage both minority and majority groups in processes of change will only succeed if such efforts are able to resonate with people’s existing needs and values – such as income and employment, familial care, a sense of belonging, or religious belief. Even if initiatives seek to transform existing values, or to foster new ones, they need to begin by speaking to what is already valued if they wish to generate sufficient buy-in. Abstract language around inclusion, diversity or inequality can prompt disinterest or even cynicism.

Both majority and minority groups are more successfully engaged through positive agendas that focus on potential and invite collaboration, rather than through a focus on division, conflict or social pathologies. On a national level, there is similar scope for positive approaches that prioritise treating inter-group harmony as a public good, rather than focusing on ethnic divides as a problem to be targeted and eliminated. At all levels, problem-driven approaches run the risk of failing to address the multi-dimensional nature of challenges surrounding discrimination and inequality. In contrast, potential-driven approaches are likely to generate greater buy-in, tap more deeply into community needs, experiences, skills and expertise, and foster common values and forms of collaboration that may serve as flexible resources for further change.

2. Pay attention to the relationship between discrimination and inequality

Discrimination and inequality are distinct but closely entangled problems, and efforts to address one will often require work to address the other. Segregation, inter-group conflict and prejudice are closely connected to resourcing issues, linked not only to deprivation but also to a lack of support for groups to come together. Relevant resources may include:
as language classes; spaces for gathering; or frameworks for supporting inter-faith or inter-community projects.

Likewise, inequality is often sustained through various forms of discrimination. Both discrimination and inequality will take different forms for people of different genders, sexualities, ages and abilities, and attention to this variation is needed in order to properly identify and respond to these challenges.

3. Support communities, don’t just call on them

Debates around diversity and cohesion often look to communities as key sites for building or rebuilding understandings and connections. Evidence suggests that facilitating contact between people from diverse backgrounds, and building inclusive local cultures, can make an important difference. However, this process is unlikely to commence or succeed without significant facilitation, time and support. To some extent, existing community resources can be drawn upon, to this end. Faith communities may have an especially important role to play in providing connections, resources and commitment to togetherness. However, faith-led networks and outreach are unlikely to engage everyone in a local area, and the framing of faith-led initiatives will likewise not be compelling for everyone. Care should be taken that alternatives also exist, to expand the scope of such efforts beyond faith communities.

More generally, calls for community-based approaches need to be adequately resourced. Especially in the present moment, communities need actively bringing together; they are not simply latent resources, ready to be drawn upon. As such, they cannot be treated as a cut-cost option; such interventions are unlikely to be widely inclusive or particularly robust. It should be recognised that community-led work is often slow and uneven, and that the successful cultivation of new connections and belonging may look different across different individuals and groups. Approaches to funding and evaluation should be careful to avoid prescribing overly specific outcomes that limit projects rather than enabling them to cultivate plural forms of interconnected inclusion and belonging.
4. Make sure your approach is robust and credible

There is a long history of efforts to promote equality and belonging, both at a national level and within organisations. Insofar as both inequality and discrimination still persist, members of both majority and minority groups may be wary of such efforts – associating them with detached and tokenistic ‘ meddling’, rather than with meaningful change. Historically, this problem has been made worse by rapidly-changing national agendas, which undermine long-term local change, and by the reliance on voluntary efforts to promote equality, which may result in efforts that can only produce limited results. To overcome disinterest and disillusionment, there is an increasing need to address this history of past efforts and to credibly distinguish present interventions from past limitations. Credibility may emerge from: careful research and consultation; involving community members in formulating policy; attending to both common and group-differentiated concerns; ensuring sufficient power to both incentivise and punish; responsive programme design; and evidence of long-term commitment.

5. Representation matters

The ways in which different identities and narratives of belonging are depicted in public have an impact on shaping both bias and inclusion. Those with large-scale platforms need to pay attention to the sorts of faces, backgrounds and narratives being represented on those platforms. In what ways do they depict diversity as something abnormal and threatening, or as a source of friction? Conversely, how might differences be portrayed as a source of potential, or as the basis for forging common values, instead? Messages of inclusion or exclusion are reinforced or broken down through repetition across a range of media – so everything from the tone of public advertising, to the ways in which organisations seek to avoid or mediate conflict between employees, can play a role in constructing these messages.

History and education are two particularly important areas in which representation can play a formative role in shaping attitudes towards race, equality and belonging. History is often
appealed to as a resource for imagining national identity and future directions. A deeper acknowledgement of Britain’s colonial heritage and interconnection could play a critical role in opening up future possibilities for rethinking the terms of citizenship and belonging. Education plays a vital role, not only because of its significance in teaching historical narratives, but because, for many minorities, exclusion, prejudice and hostility are experienced as challenges embedded in the fabric of everyday life. The same is true of instances in which groups avoid the sorts of everyday interactions that might nurture greater understanding, on the basis of existing prejudices or apprehensions. Schools play an essential role in shaping the everyday understandings, perspectives, values, and habits of interaction of young Britons, and they thus have greater purchase on these challenges than many other institutions.

Equal representation needs to be a dynamic matter, capable of change and nuance, and of speaking to a wide spectrum of experience, rather than a box-ticking exercise. Rather than simply including people from different racial backgrounds, consider whether your platform depicts a range of class and family perspectives, as well as personal life histories and experiences, and differences in belief, opinion and personality. Ask whether such depictions are likely to resonate with the people being represented themselves, or whether they risk coming across as contrived.

Nuanced storytelling can also be an effective way of driving conversations around difficult histories or contentious present issues. Where an explicit naming of issues may be divisive, personal stories can allow a range of audiences to develop different forms of personal identification, and so to approach such issues through a personal lens.

Members of minority groups may struggle to identify with shared narratives, symbols or values, not simply because they come from different backgrounds, but also because these forms of representation have come to be associated with a range of everyday hardships. Acknowledging histories of exclusion and
discrimination – including those tied to colonialism – plays an important role in destabilising popular prejudices and opening up spaces for new identities and belonging.

Meanwhile, telling more inclusive stories has the potential to help build or support more inclusive understandings of British identity. The school curriculum and national media could do more to highlight the long history of migration, diversity and the mixing of groups in Britain, the feelings of 'Britishness' experienced by colonial and post-colonial migrants, and the contribution of non-white troops to the Great Wars. Such narratives could help to highlight the presence and experiences of minority groups in relation to key, foundational moments for British identity, and inform current understandings of inequality, identity and belonging in Britain today.
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The following is a list of the people who have contributed to the development of this report by participating in the conference and consultation discussions that we convened at Cumberland Lodge in the 12 months leading up to publication.

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